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

ROUND TABLE

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY:

Principle versus Expediency

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A Radio Discussion by

* ERNEST COLWELL
* WILLIAM HALPERIN
* FRANKLIN SCOTT

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January 31, 1943

Around the Round Table . . . .

Ernest C. Colwell, dean of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago since 1939, received his Ph.B. degree at Emory University (Atlanta, Ga.), his B.D. at Candler School of Theology, and his Ph.D. degree at the University of Chicago. He taught English literature and Bible at Emory University before he came to the University of Chicago in 1930 to teach New Testament literature. He is a regular contributor to religious journals and the author of numerous books, among which are: *The Greek of the Fourth Gospel* (1931); *John Defends the Gospel* (1936); *The Study of the Bible* (1937); *The Four Gospels of Karahissar*, Vol. I (1936); *Elizabeth Day McCormick Apocalypse*, Vol. II (1939); and editor of *A Greek Papyrus Reader* (with E. J. Goodspeed) (1935) and *A Hellenistic Greek Reader* (with J. R. Mantey) (1939).

S. William Halperin, assistant professor of modern history at the University of Chicago, received his undergraduate training and A.B. degree from the University of Chicago, where he also did his graduate work and was granted his Ph.D. degree. Dr. Halperin has taught at Kansas State Teachers College as well as the University of Chicago. His special interest is in modern European history, and he is working on a general history of Europe since 1919. He is the author of *The Separation of Church and State in Italian Thought from Cavour to Mussolini* (1937) and *Italy and the Vatican at War* (1939).

Franklin D. Scott, associate professor of modern history at Northwestern University, received his undergraduate training at the University of Chicago, where he was granted a Ph.B. degree. Continuing his studies there, he was awarded an M.A. degree before he went to Harvard to receive his Ph.D. Dr. Scott has also studied and done extensive research abroad, especially at the University of Stockholm, Sweden, and in the Scandinavian countries. Dr. Scott has taught also at Simpson College, Radcliffe, and the University of Wisconsin. He is a contributor to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* and is the author of *Bernadotte and the Fall of Napoleon* (1935), which in 1937 had the distinction of being translated into Swedish. Dr. Scott is now engaged in preparing a general history of Scandinavia.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY:

Principle versus Expediency

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MR. COLWELL: A necessary and preliminary question that we must face is why the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE selected this topic, "American Foreign Policy," in the midst of war. A second question is like unto it: Doesn't the discussion of "American Foreign Policy" now involve the discussion of expediency versus principle?

MR. SCOTT: Yes, I think that the second one is right. It is a question of expediency and principle—expediency which during time of war must perhaps take precedence over principle. With regard to the first, I think that the obvious reason for discussing this thing now is the very fact that we are at war. Were we not at war, we wouldn't have to. Being in war and being a democratic country, we must necessarily discuss and consider deeply both the immediate and the future policies that we want to follow.

MR. HALPERIN: I think that we must get down to cases here in dealing with the issue of principle versus expediency. We have the North African muddle, as it is known in the press and in public discussion—a muddle which has had a very definite effect upon the thinking and the morale of all the peoples of the United Nations. We have to look at the results of the abandonment of principle in favor of expediency.[1] What do you think, Colwell?

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[1] See Henri Bloch, Louis Gottschalk, and Franklin Scott, *France*, a University of Chicago ROUND TABLE transcript, No. 243, broadcast November 15, 1942.

MR. COLWELL: I believe that that is true. The question is whether an immediate and urgent military decision should be made solely with reference to the battle or the specific campaign and without reference to our long-run objectives.

MR. SCOTT: One can't make immediate decisions without reference to long-term objectives, but sometimes one has to take into consideration immediate circumstances as well as long-term objectives. The North African situation is one specific example of that necessity. As the war goes on, we are going to face other examples of the same kind.

MR. HALPERIN: For example, there is the case of Italy. Following principle in Italy would mean dealing only with anti-Fascist elements there—elements that have demonstrated unquestionably their loyalty to democratic principles. Expediency would mean dealing with, say, the House of Savoy, which is just as responsible as Mussolini for the present plight of Italy.[2]

MR. COLWELL: The same issue may well arise when it comes to establishing terms of peace with Germany. A matter of principle would mean, I assume, that we would not deal with Göring or with a *Junker* military clique in attempting to establish peace in Germany, but expediency might say that if Göring or the German generals can deliver the *Luftwaffe* to us and turn over the might of German arms and thus save lives, we should deal with these men, at the price of establishing them in Germany.

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[2] See Giuseppe Borgese, Harold Deutsch, and Louis Gottschalk, *Italy*, a University of Chicago ROUND TABLE transcript, No. 247, broadcast December 13, 1942.

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MR. SCOTT: Yes, that's one specific point. Another thing that complicates the issue are our relations with a country like Finland, which is now at war with Russia and with Britain but which is not at war with the United States. When the time of the peace comes, we're going to have to settle that particular question, which is a very delicate one. I don't know just how we're going to solve that on the basis of either principle or expediency. It's going to be a matter of difference of opinion probably among Russia, Britain, and the United States.

MR. HALPERIN: Look at the question of Spain. We have been dealing with Franco on the basis of expediency, and certainly, from the looks of things, it has not done us a great deal of good. Franco only recently has reiterated his complete fidelity to the Axis, and I think that it is more than likely that if his military services should ever be needed by Hitler, they will be offered to him without hesitation.

MR. SCOTT: But they haven't been so far.

MR. HALPERIN: Yes, but the situation is very fluid, as you will admit.

MR. SCOTT: Quite right.

MR. COLWELL: There are other instances, and we could spend the entire half-hour, I believe, justifiably listing the extremely wide range of areas and specific situations in which this particular issue will inevitably be raised. But it all boils down, it seems to me, to a basic general question of how far is it justifiable to go in compromising long-run objectives in order to reach an immediate military victory.

MR. HALPERIN: I feel that if we take any chances at all with our long-run objectives, on any grounds whatsoever, moral or political, practical or theoretical, we automatically jeopardize the attainment

GREMLINS AT CASABLANCA

Some Questions as yet Unanswered*

Was anything done about the creation of a Supreme War Council?

Was there any attempt to draw the Chinese Government into the Conference?

What about the North African political muddle?

Were the rumors of the presence of Italian leaders true? What does it mean?

Did the meeting advance readiness for full United Nations cooperation in building the postwar world?

* See *PM*, January 28, 1943.

of these all-important objectives which make this present war meaningful to us.

MR. SCOTT: Perhaps so. At any rate, let's, for a moment, turn and ask ourselves what our long-term objectives are. We need to get that settled before we can decide on just what basis we might compromise or refuse to compromise.

MR. COLWELL: That is true. But is the question what *are* our long-run objectives—that is, should we just summarize the statements of government officials and the record of the State Department—or should we discuss what our long-run objectives *should* be?

MR. SCOTT: Correction sustained. I would agree, absolutely, that what we must really discuss is what should be our long-run objectives, for the democratic people of the United States have the right to determine what those goals should be. I don't believe that the Atlantic Charter or the Four Freedoms, or anything else, puts the thing quite precisely just yet.

I would say that it is our first and foremost objective to establish a peaceful and, therefore, a well-organized world.

MR. HALPERIN: I would say that another primary objective should be to do everything in our power to insure the prevalence of democracy throughout the world.

MR. SCOTT: Oh, there, Halperin, I don't know just how far you mean to go, but if you mean to go so far as to have the United States attempt to impose democracy on other countries, be they Spain or Japan or Guadalcanal or Borneo, then I would say, "No, no"—partly because, in the very first place, we do not have the power to do that kind of a job all over this earth with its two billion people.

MR. HALPERIN: I think that you are exaggerating the difficulty

of this particular policy. You must remember, for example, that in Italy there was a democracy which existed for years and years prior to the advent of Mussolini, and I, for one, am confident that if the opportunity should be offered, the majority of the Italian people would be glad to go back to their democratic system and would facilitate the work of those who might assist them in that process.

MR. COLWELL: I would agree with part of what Halperin says and with part of what Scott has just said. I believe that Halperin is too optimistic—that he has grandiose ideas if he talks about establishing democracy throughout the world. If this is an objective, it is such a long-range objective that it needs more time than our lifetime. But I would agree, also, that there is the possibility of building democracy measurably.

MR. HALPERIN: We shall run the risk of losing this war entirely if we do not have grandiose objectives. I think that we must do things and say things and work for things that will fire the imagination of people everywhere. We can't win this war simply by using old slogans and old shibboleths.

MR. SCOTT: No, quite right. But if we're going to use these grandiose concepts for the creation of a world that will last a thousand years, then we're going to have to be willing to wait a little while in the accomplishment of those objectives.

You mention, for instance, Halperin, the democracy of Italy in the period before Mussolini came to power. As I've seen that democracy at work, I don't think that it was a very perfect democracy.

MR. HALPERIN: No, certainly not, but what democracy that you've ever known has been perfect? Do you think that our democracy is perfect? Or is the democracy of Great Britain perfect? Or was the French democracy, before Pétain, perfect?

MR. SCOTT: Decidedly not.

MR. HALPERIN: The point is that democracy in Italy worked comparably to the way that it has worked in other countries, and there is no reason to assume that if Italy gets another chance, she will not be able to evolve another system which will compare quite favorably with democracies elsewhere.

MR. COLWELL: It seems to me that our University of Chicago ROUND TABLE listeners would like to know how the question of the relative perfection of democracy in Italy, or these other countries, is relevant to this objective that you have stated, namely, to insure democracy throughout the world. I would ask Scott whether or not he thinks that there is a relationship there. How good must we be as a democracy before we try to export democracy?

MR. SCOTT: I think that we can try to export democracy by word and by deed, certainly not by military intervention. I think that the best way to export democracy is by example, and I think that so far we have very little reason to try to pluck the mote out of our neighbor's eye. I think that we have some beams in our own eye. We don't have any business taking a holier-than-thou attitude. I don't think that we have any business claiming that we have attained final perfection in a certain form of government and a form of government which is therefore useful for every people in the world.

MR. COLWELL: Yes, but any plea to await for the arrival of final perfection before engaging in international political action must be a counsel of do nothing, for if we are realists we know that we shall not reach the point of perfection.

MR. HALPERIN: I think Scott's point of view can lead only to chaos, complete chaos. If we sit around and wait for perfection, for the millennium, we shall see the world go down to war again and again.

Mr. Scott: No. The real point is this: Is the United States solely responsible for all that goes on in the rest of the world? I say, "No." I say that we must establish a peaceful and, therefore, well-organized world. In that well-organized world it should be the world organization, not any one country—America, Russia, Germany, Britain—but all those countries working in cooperation, one with another, which should attempt to establish democracy.

Mr. Colwell: Granted that this is an objective—the establishment of a peaceful and organized world—and granted that somehow or other the promotion of democracy is another objective, any discussion of the topic "American Foreign Policy" must involve a discussion as to how well expediency works in the winning of a war.

Mr. Halperin: I think that we have a very good illustration of how badly it works in the case of the appointment, for example, of a man like Peyrouton in North Africa. Who is Peyrouton? A notorious Fascist, reactionary and anti-Semitic, whose record smells to the high heavens. He is the man who is going to be our representative in Algiers. He's going to be the man who will be in charge of civil communications, transport facilities, and so on, while our troops are battling the Germans in near-by Tunis.[3]

Mr. Colwell: But the question is: Does that help win the war? Is that right?

Mr. Scott: I think so. Halperin is following the line of argument that the great majority of the American people are following right now. We don't like the smell of Peyrouton and hence we condemn the military authorities and we condemn the State Department for having put Peyrouton into power. I hold no brief for

[3] The Associated Press, on January 26, 1943, reported that Marcel Peyrouton made it clear that the only way in which French republican and liberal elements can have a part in the government of North Africa while he runs it is by abandoning their views and becoming totalitarians.

Peyrouton. I don't like the smell of that deal one bit. I'm not sure even whether it's necessary or not. But I don't think that we can clean out a barn and continue to smell like violets.

MR. HALPERIN: That may be, but I haven't finished. The effects of Peyrouton's appointment are not limited only to North Africa. As far as we can tell, they have already affected the morale of people throughout oppressed Europe and have affected the morale of the British public.

We have here a situation in which we are in danger of destroying what is perhaps our most potent ally. We must remember that in this war ideas are weapons—feelings, beliefs, convictions are weapons—and that we are here playing fast and loose with those convictions and running the risk of alienating what would be a most potent ally at a crucial moment when, for example, our troops may set foot upon the continent of Europe. When guerrilla movements back of the lines would be of extreme military importance, those movements may fail to materialize precisely because in advance we have undermined the moral foundations of our position.

MR. SCOTT: I quite agree with you. This thing has absolutely aroused a furor in public opinion not only in the United States but among the British and various peoples all over the world. I think that it's very much too bad that that has happened. The people of the world by objecting to this kind of thing have, to a considerable extent, shown their lack of realism about the carrying-on of war.

For example, in France many people—not only the leaders like Pétain, Laval, Darlan—have adapted themselves to the German collaboration policy, but vast masses of French burghers and peasants have adapted themselves as well.

MR. HALPERIN: I don't know what you mean by "adapted," Scott.

Mr. Scott: Why don't they understand that we must do the same thing, perhaps, in North Africa? They think that they have to do it within France; the Danes have to do it within Denmark, and so on, because they do not have the power to resist. They complain about the United States' doing it in North Africa because they think that the United States has such overwhelming power that it doesn't need to do it. I am a little dubious about that.

May I ask you specifically, suppose you had had the responsibility that rested on the shoulders of General Eisenhower, what would you have done when faced with the necessary decision to make in North Africa?

Mr. Halperin: Of course, as a military leader he has certain responsibilities, but there are also political responsibilities upon the political leaders.

Mr. Scott: What would you have done in similar circumstances?

Mr. Halperin: I think that if I were in charge of the political administration of this country, I would keep my eye focused constantly upon the long-run objective and would do everything in my power to avoid action or policy which might, in any way, minimize the possibility of achieving that objective or which might undermine the enthusiasm for liberty and democracy of the oppressed peoples of Europe, who are going to be or will be our most potent allies in this war.

Mr. Colwell: Yes, but the issue in our program is not a discussion of what military policy should be. It's a discussion of what foreign policy should be. Your insistence, Halperin, that it's a question of political decision is a clarifying emphasis. But we should realize that our political leaders are now telling us to let military expediency determine what shall happen throughout the war and

to concentrate on the war and forget politics, forgetting matters of long-run policy until the war is won.

Mr. Scott: Colwell, you're quoting Secretary Hull, in negative fashion I'll admit, when he said, "For heaven's sake, can't we forget about politics for a little while and concentrate on the war?" That phrase has been hit upon by editorial writers all over the country and condemned. I think that what Hull really had in mind was simply this: We are now in war, and we must concentrate upon the winning of the war in order to attain political objectives. In peacetime, politics are predominant. In wartime, the military is and must be predominant. Politics must serve military causes.

Mr. Colwell: I can never believe that the predominance is military, for we must be fighting for some end that is important politically to this country, however narrowly it is defined, and all military operations are designed to serve that goal.

Mr. Scott: Yes, that's right.

Mr. Halperin: Of course, by separating politics from war and the military operations of war, we run the risk of losing the war itself, because, after all, this war is a total war; it's an ideological war; it's a political war as well as a military war.

Hitler uses ideological and political weapons all the time and has used them with devastating effect. If we wish to be able to counter that propaganda and that position, we've got to use all the moral means at our disposal. We've got to keep intact the moral foundations of our position, or, if we win militarily, we will find that we have won a very hollow victory. We shall have a victory without peace; we shall have victory without security—a victory without the assurance of decent living for people everywhere.

Mr. Colwell: There is another aspect of that. In the waging of war and the taking of specific actions on the grounds of expedi-

ency, do we not build up a pattern which may be continued, whether we think it is desirable for it to be continued or not?

MR. HALPERIN: Exactly.

MR. COLWELL: Look at the record of our diplomacy for the last ten years. It seems to run fairly consistently in one direction, and the action in North Africa does not seem to me to be a contrast to previous foreign actions.[4]

MR. SCOTT: Yes, I think that you're right, unfortunately; but I don't think that we can sit back in our academic halls and complain against the government for that kind of policy. The government of the United States in dealing with Japan, in dealing with Germany, and so on, has been doing very largely what was absolutely imposed upon it by American public opinion. For example, could we some ten years ago have imposed an embargo against Japan on account of the Manchurian episode?

MR. COLWELL: No, I agree with you that we could not.

MR. SCOTT: Because it would have risked war, and the American people wouldn't stand for war.

MR. HALPERIN: But all you're saying is that the American people have been wrong. Does that mean we've got to stay wrong?

MR. SCOTT: We don't have to stay wrong, but we must be unitedly right before our government can pursue a definite policy.

MR. HALPERIN: Certainly if our policy of expediency was wrong up to 1939, I see no reason to believe that it's going to be much better after 1939.

MR. COLWELL: The fact is that the role of government in re-

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[4] See *Peace and War—United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941*, released by State Department, January 5, 1943. Washington: Government Printing Office.

gard to political leadership in wartime is a more important role proportionately than it is in times of peace, since the expression of public opinion and the possession of facts by the public are both limited.

MR. SCOTT: Yes.

MR. COLWELL: Therefore, it seems to me that the government itself must encourage the discussion of political objectives and these matters that affect morale.

MR. SCOTT: Absolutely.

MR. COLWELL: But, aside from the immediate questions which we've discussed—the relevance of this to the winning of a particular campaign or battle—let's go back to the more general questions with which we began. How are our long-run objectives to be built into the structure of things after the last gun is fired?

MR. HALPERIN: First of all, we've got to make it a basic principle of ours that we shall endeavor, wherever possible, to promote and encourage the development of democracy.

MR. SCOTT: Halperin, may I ask if in that connection you would say that we must take the American Constitution to Morocco?

MR. HALPERIN: If by taking the American Constitution to Morocco it's going to save American lives and American institutions, I say, "Yes." It's a cheap price to pay.

MR. SCOTT: Now, you're talking expediency.

MR. HALPERIN: Call it anything you like. The fact is that if by this process we shall save our institutions and our democracy, I call that adherence to principles even if it happens to be expedient in this case.

MR. SCOTT: I don't think that with regard to establishing the

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UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE PICTOMAP by HAROLD HAYDON

American Constitution in Morocco we would even save our institutions, for I don't think that the people of Morocco, or the people of a great many other countries on this earth, are ready for the kind of democracy which we, through generations and centuries, have developed in the Anglo-Saxon countries.

MR. COLWELL: That may be true, but the issue really is whether we shall deal in Morocco with men whose entire record is one of hostility to American practices. Shall we tolerate the continued existence in concentration camps of people who are fighting for the ideals we believe we are devoted to?

It is a question not of establishing the American Constitution in North Africa but of working with people whose basic sympathies are with us.

MR. SCOTT: In your mind that is the question. I would say that we should not do so any more than is absolutely necessary for immediate means, but I would say at the same time that we have to deal with the leaders of people who can really deliver the goods. We cannot during time of war create internal revolutions in every country where the government is abhorrent to us.

MR. HALPERIN: After all, Scott, you must remember that this is a story, and, as a student of international politics, you know it very well. Fascism is indivisible, like peace and democracy. Wherever fascism exists, it's a pistol at America's head. If we allow it to fester and exist in any one part of the world, the poison's going to spread until we shall have on our hands the colossal job of our American boys' fighting another war maybe fifteen or twenty years from now. It's that kind of prospect that faces us if we're squeamish, if we're hesitant, if we're willing to compromise, if we're willing to undermine, as I said before, the moral and the spiritual foundations of our position, which I think is first-rate. It's first-rate because it has the overwhelming support of the peoples of the

world. If we disillusion them, if we throw them back into a state of despair and apathy, we run the risk of not only losing the war but of building the kind of a peace that will be a sham and hollow.

MR. SCOTT: Just a minute. We are all absolutely opposed to fascism. Our only argument today is over which is the best method of destroying fascism.

MR. HALPERIN: I'd say that working against fascism is the best way of destroying it.

MR. SCOTT: Just a minute. I maintain that we have to compromise sometimes on our long-term objectives . . . .

MR. HALPERIN: On our long-term objectives! . . . .

MR. SCOTT: . . . . in order to accomplish the major objective. I think, for example, that the major object is to destroy fascism in Germany, not to destroy a particular little petty regime in Morocco and Algeria.

MR. HALPERIN: But, Scott, that kind of Machiavellianism is exactly what is responsible for our present tragedy.

MR. SCOTT: That isn't Machiavellianism . . . .

MR. HALPERIN: Look at the record of our expediency.

MR. SCOTT: . . . . that is straightforward politics.

MR. COLWELL: My dear historians, let's leave Machiavellianism and the other polysyllabic titles which are part of the special lore of your learning and your distinctive disciplines on the table for a minute.

As a man who isn't a great historian or a specialist in that field, I would like to challenge something. Is democracy indivisible, as Halperin has said? Is it not true that in American life democracy is somewhat divided? There are areas of our living where we have

not been able to mediate as much democratic value and as much participation in the rights of our society to small groups as we should have done. If that is true, does it follow that we have nothing to say to the rest of the world in regard to democracy?

MR. HALPERIN: I think that it does not, Colwell. The fact that our democracy is not perfect, and we all admit it is not perfect, has nothing to do with the larger problem of international relations.

MR. SCOTT: I think that we had better attend to some of our own problems in our own back yard as well as try to export democracy and try to influence the rest of the world.

MR. HALPERIN: Of course, that is taken for granted.

MR. SCOTT: We take it a little too much for granted without doing quite enough about it.

MR. HALPERIN: I'll grant you that.

MR. SCOTT: As we said a moment ago, the best way to export democracy is by example.

MR. COLWELL: Scott seems to me to be saying that we have to be perfect, we have to be pure democracies, before we have any contribution to make to the democracy of the rest of the world, while Halperin seems to be saying that we can only cooperate with other countries that are pure democracies.

MR. SCOTT: I wouldn't accept quite that definition. We have a contribution to make to the rest of the world because of the progress that we have made in democracy, but the progress that we have made is imperfect, and neither that nor anything else—neither moral right nor legal right—permits us to go to dominate and establish democracy by force in other areas which do not want it.

I think, for instance, that there is such a thing as democracy among nations as well as democracy within nations. That prin-

ciple, to which I would agree absolutely as a principle, is and means that we must cooperate in an international organization; we must not intervene individually in a particular country.

MR. COLWELL: But there Halperin differs with you.

MR. HALPERIN: Exactly. After all, I'm not saying that we must go about with a sword in our hand and stick everybody in the belly that doesn't like us. That isn't the point at all. The point is that we must be resolved upon the imperative and the paramount importance of establishing democracy throughout the world. Until we do and until we have worked toward that end, we shall not be able to exploit and fructify the fruits of victory. We shall find that we have been building upon very, very hollow foundations.

MR. SCOTT: Quite right. But let me ask you a simple question: Do you approve of our cooperation with Stalin in Soviet Russia?

MR. HALPERIN: Yes.

MR. SCOTT: Do you agree with all the principles of Stalin?

MR. HALPERIN: No.

MR. SCOTT: If you are willing to cooperate with Stalin, though you do disagree with his principles, I imagine that you would also say that the United States has no particular business going into Russia and trying to reform her in our way after the war is over?

MR. HALPERIN: I'm talking about two very definite things here. One thing, Scott, is that we must do everything in our power to bring about democracy. I do not say that we should try to do things where the things are impossible to be done.

Furthermore, in the case of Russia, there is a very special instance. There is a country which certainly did a great deal previously to contribute to the outbreak of this war—no doubt about it—and it is also a country which has a dictatorial regime.

But you have the all-important fact that the Russians have shed blood for our cause. They have fought and died on the battlefields of Europe for the common cause for which we are all fighting. That, in my opinion, washes away everything else for the moment.

MR. SCOTT: That doesn't sound like a long-term principle to me.

MR. HALPERIN: As for Stalin himself, he apparently has satisfied the heads of our government and the heads of the British government that he is willing to cooperate for the establishment of post-war plans and post-war orders and so on.

MR. SCOTT: I would just like to say that I think that we need to take a very farsighted policy while we pursue all kinds of means by which to gain that policy. We must remember always that the political ethics of a people grow out of the traditions of that individual people.

MR. COLWELL: In this University of Chicago ROUND TABLE discussion of "American Foreign Policy," we are convinced that the issue of military expediency against long-run objectives is an important one and one that should be openly discussed by the American people.

We agree that expediency must be measured by its contribution to long-run objectives; that two of these objectives are, first, the establishment of a peaceful and organized world and, second, the promotion of democratic life throughout the world.

We disagree as to the method by which we should work toward world democracy. Since a peaceful world order is clearly desirable, may it not be that we should work toward the promotion of world democracy through the immediate establishment of a United Nations Council as the forerunner of the first objective and the servant of the second?

The Encyclopaedia Britannica

A gift to the University of Chicago of Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., by Sears, Roebuck and Company was announced last week by President Robert M. Hutchins of the University and General R. E. Wood, chairman of the board of Sears. The gift includes the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, *Britannica Book of the Year*, *Britannica Junior*, and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica World Atlas*.

Oldest and most famous continuing publication in the world, the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* was first issued in Edinburgh in 1768 and is now in its one hundred and seventy-fifth year. Its distribution is world-wide, with subsidiary companies in England, Canada, and South Africa. These companies are included in the gift.

The *Encyclopaedia Britannica* is one of the best-known educational efforts in the world," President Hutchins said in announcing the gift. "Certainly the *Britannica* is one of the earliest forms of extension education. Its acquisition by the University is a natural continuation of the policy of encouraging extension education inaugurated by Dr. William Rainey Harper.

The *Encyclopaedia* is now kept up to date by the editorial method of continuous annual revision, which eliminates the necessity for periodical new editions. Faculty committees of the University will provide educational advice and consultation to assist in securing scholarly and scientific authorities for this continuous revision. The *Encyclopaedia* henceforth will bear the imprimatur of the University of Chicago."

Association of a university with the *Britannica* is not a wholly new departure, President Hutchins pointed out, for the famous Eleventh Edition bore the name of Cambridge University and was known as the "Cambridge edition."

More on This Topic

COHN, DAVID L., "Tariff or No Tariff," *Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1943. *Argues that the American people really have no objective in their foreign policy except isolation.*

DOLIVET, LOUIS, "The Danger in the European Policy of the United Nations," *Free World*, February, 1943. *Says that the United Nations must adopt a democratic policy.*

Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–41. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1942. *An introduction to a collection of documents concerning United States foreign relations.*

SMITH, KINGSBURY, "The American Plan for a Reorganized World," *Reader's Digest*, January, 1943. *Report on American foreign policy objectives.*

———, "Our Government's Case for Expediency," *American Mercury*, February, 1943. *Says that the war policy of the United States government is to win as cheaply and quickly as possible and that after the victory has been won is the time to seek support for the Four Freedoms.*

STONE, I. F., "Moral Issue for Mr. Hull," *Nation*, January 30, 1943. *Says that the State Department is responsible for the Peyrouton appointment.*

WELLES, SUMNER, "Our Foreign Policy," *Vital Speeches*, January 15, 1943. *A speech in which he said: "The foreign policy of any nation must inevitably be a policy of self-interest. The foreign policy of the United States should ever be a policy based upon that course and upon those principles which, in the judgment of the American people themselves, will most clearly further the individual interest of their country and the general welfare of the people of the United States."*

What Do *You* Think?

1. Under what circumstances do you think there is a deep-rooted conflict between quick military victory and basic democratic principles? How far do you think it is justifiable to go in compromising principles in order to reach a military victory?

2. Do you approve of the so-called "deals" with Fascists if it will help us win an immediate military victory? Do you regard the appointment of Marcel Peyrouton as governor of Algeria as acceptable? What are examples in other countries of possible "principle versus expediency" choices the American government may have to face as time goes on?

3. In your opinion what are the long-run objectives of the foreign policy of the United States? Do you agree with Mr. Halperin that a "primary objective should be to do everything in our power to insure the prevalence of democracy throughout the world"? Discuss.

4. In your opinion can we wait until the peace settlement before attempting to achieve our foreign policy objectives? Will the peace period be sufficiently fluid so that we can then attain them? Or would present "expediency deals" prevent success in attaining them?

5. What is the effect on the unity of the United Nations of expediency arrangements such as the Peyrouton appointment in North Africa? What is the effect on the morale of the Fighting French?

6. Do you favor the immediate establishment of a United Nations Council? Would such a Council be better able to decide questions of expediency as they arise? Discuss.

The People Say....

The following letters are representative of the views expressed by the ROUND TABLE *audience on "Behind the Labor Crisis," broadcast January 24, 1943.*

*

Responsibility Needed

With any organization with power comparable to labor unions there should go responsibility. Therefore, unions should be subject to whatever measures may be necessary to carry responsibility. A public audit including record of receipts and expenditures certainly is a desirable step, but supervision of elections and officers may or may not be desirable.—*A listener from New York, New York*

*

Strikes Not Now Preventable

I think that strikes are not now preventable, but I think they should not be positively encouraged by unions, just as the taking-over of plants should be regarded as a last resort by the government, or the discharge of a good employee should be regarded as a last resort by management. In fact, labor-union demands should be enforced, never by idleness with its attendant waste in men and machines, but by some sort of continued production. I am not clear how this could be done, but, for instance, dissident musicians could play for army camp entertainments; farmers would give milk to persons unable to buy it rather than throwing it away, and possibly a union would be strong enough to organize a cooperative enterprise in which production could still go on without management profiting. ....—*A listener from Washington, D.C.*

*

War Labor Board Doing Good Job

.... Secretary Perkins, who should know more about its [War Labor Board] success than anyone else, told Congress on January 15 that the War Labor System had worked "99% of the time." Such cases as the Miners' Strike get the headlines and the radio time, instead of the 99% of the cases that are settled quietly and peacefully. The one criticism which might be leveled at the War Labor Board is the fact that its staff is so woefully inadequate to handle the amount of work which comes under its jurisdiction, particularly now that all wage increases must have WLB approval. Cases sent to the Board in the fall have not yet been acted upon. Unless WLB can have sufficient staff to handle wage-increase cases within a reasonable length of time, there naturally will be increasing criticism, unnecessary unrest and dissatisfaction among workers' groups unable to get

ection on their petitions. . . . . So far as "irresponsible labor leadership and policy" are concerned, I rather suspect that labor leadership would compare very favorably with leadership in either business or government over a period of years.

Rights of labor, long taken for granted in Great Britain, the Scandinavian countries, and other places, are still bitterly opposed in the United States. Because this attitude was prevalent here for so many years and because we in America have been brought up on the American magazine-type of success story, workers did not recognize either the need of unions or their place in the economic program of the nation and are only now beginning to take their place in the organized labor movement. . . . .—*A listener from Decatur, Illinois*

*

Public Audit All Right If . . . .

. . . . I think that adequate safeguards should surround all activities of the unions, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the United States Chamber of Commerce. I do not think that Congress should regulate one of these bodies without applying the same regulations to each of the three named bodies. To public-audit the union activities only would put a powerful weapon in the hands of labor's enemies; but to require a public audit of the books of accounts of all the three named associations or unions will be in the public interest. I think that a uniform system of elections should be applied to the elections of all the officers of the three named agencies and that the policing of this system should be under the control of the Congress. . . . .—*A listener from Atlanta, Georgia*

*

Unions Need More Regulation

. . . . It seems to me that Congress should regulate unions more closely than it now does. Unions are a definite institution in our social system and have been recognized as such by the government. Their activities have as direct a bearing on our national well-being as those of businessmen and corporations and consequently should be under as close a scrutiny. A union can lobby in a manner that would in the case of a corporation cause a national howl of disapproval. . . . .—*A listener from Bennettsville, South Carolina*

*

Why Blame Labor Only?

. . . . I am sure that a large number of laborers realize that the labor union setup is far from ideal. But it is probably their only chance for any consideration. Strikes, at this time, are certainly a shameful disgrace. But why place all the blame on the laborers? Unquestionably, the "closed shop" policy is not democratic and would not be tolerated if we had a true democracy. But how are we going to get it with our present setup, since a true democracy is impossible without an educated and intelligent citizenry? . . . .—*A listener from Winthrop, Washington*

*

Need Better Information

. . . . I refer to your statement that labor needs to be made *aware* of the importance of its task. My hus-

band is a minor executive in a large plant and from what he tells me I am positive that an effort to so inform workers would have a tremendously stimulating effect. Take the night worker who misses all or most of the really stimulating radio programs—rarely sees a newsreel—all he knows is what he reads in the paper—and he's too weary to read. Make management aware of this need, and it will overcome its greatest "headache"—absenteeism!—*A listener from Lakewood, Ohio*

*

Prohibit Strikes in Wartimes

. . . . It seems to me that the labor problem in time of war differs very much from the problem in peacetime. The demand for labor is heavy now, wages are high and the program of organized labor is quite different from the one normally pursued in peacetime. . . . . As long as we have a free economy, I believe strikes are justifiable. During the war period, when business is so strongly controlled by government, I believe strikes should be absolutely prohibited. In normal times, I believe strikes are justifiable when management refuses to negotiate in good faith over wages or working conditions. . . . . I am opposed to labor-management committees at this time. Before such an arrangement can function, labor must have much stronger and more capable leadership. As a matter of principle, I am opposed to union security or the closed shop. . . . .—*A listener from St. Louis, Missouri*

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239. *The Rediscovery of America*
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243. *France*
244. *Crisis Administration*
245. *The Challenge to Local Government*
246. *After One Year of War—What Have We Learned?*
247. *Italy*
248. *Social Security: Challenge to Democracy*
249. *Woodrow Wilson: Prophet or Visionary*
250. *Things To Come: How Science May Shape the Next Twenty-five Years*
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252. *Are We Well Informed?*
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2:00 P.M. EASTERN WAR TIME

City	Call Letters	Kilocycles	City	Call Letters	Kilocycles
Allentown, Pa.	WSAN	1470	Martinsville, Va.	WMVA	1450
Altoona, Pa.	WFBG	1340	Miami, Fla.	WIOD	610
Asheville, N.C.	WISE	1400	New York, N.Y.	WEAF	660
Atlanta, Ga.	WSB	750	Norfolk, Va.	WTAR	790
Bluefield, W.Va.	WHIS	1440	Philadelphia, Pa.	KYW	1060
Boston, Mass.	WBZ	1030	Pittsburgh, Pa.	KDKA	1020
Charleston, S.C.	WTMA	1250	Portland, Me.	WCSH	970
Charleston, W.Va.	WGKV	1490	Providence, R.I.	WJAR	920
Charlotte, N.C.	WSOC	1240	Reading, Pa.	WEEU	850
Cincinnati, Ohio	WLW	700	Richmond, Va.	WMBG	1380
Clarksburg, W.Va.	WBLK	1400	Rochester, N.Y.	WHAM	1180
Cleveland, Ohio	WTAM	1100	Savannah, Ga.	WSAV	1340
Columbia, S.C.	WIS	560	Springfield, Mass.	WBZA	1030
Detroit, Mich.	WWJ	950	Springfield, Ohio	WIZE	1340
Florence, S.C.	WOLS	1230	Syracuse, N.Y.	WSYR	570
Grand Rapids, Mich.	WOOD	1300	Tampa, Fla.	WFLA	970
Greenville, S.C.	WFBC	1330	Toledo, Ohio	WSPD	740
Greenwood, S.C.	WCRS	1450	Washington, D.C.	WRC	980
Jacksonville, Fla.	WJAX	930	Williamsport, Pa.	WRAK	1400
Johnstown, Pa.	WJAC	1400	Wilmington, Del.	WDEL	1150
Harrisburg, Pa.	WKBO	1230	Winston-Salem, N.C.	WSJS	600
Lakeland, Fla	WLAK	1340	York, Pa.	WORK	1350
Lima, Ohio	WLOK	1240			

1:00 P.M. CENTRAL WAR TIME

City	Call Letters	Kilocycles	City	Call Letters	Kilocycles
Birmingham, Ala.	WBRC	960	Little Rock, Ark.	KARK	920
Bismarck, N.D.	KFYR	550	Louisville, Ky.	WAVE	970
Chicago, Ill.	WMAQ	670	Madison, Wis.	WIBA	1310
Dallas, Texas	WFAA	820	Mankato, Minn.	KYSM	1230
Des Moines, Iowa	WHO	1040	Mobile, Ala.	WALA	1410
Duluth, Minn., and Superior, Wis.	WEBC	1320	Montgomery, Ala.	WSFA	1440
Eau Claire, Wis.	WEAU	1070	Nashville, Tenn.	WSM	650
El Paso, Texas	KSTM	1380	New Orleans, La.	WSMB	1350
Evansville, Ind.	WGBF	1280	Oklahoma City, Okla.	WKY	930
Fargo, N.D.	WDAY	970	Omaha, Neb.	WOW	590
Fort Wayne, Ind.	WOWO	1190	Rochester, Minn.	KROC	1340
Hattiesburg, Miss.	WFOR	1400	St. Cloud, Minn.	KFAM	1450
Hibbing, Minn.	WMFG	1240	Shreveport, La.	KTBS	1480
Houston, Texas	KPRC	950	Sioux Falls, S.D.	KSOO	1140
Indianapolis, Ind.	WIRE	1430	Springfield, Mo.	KGBX	1260
Kansas City, Mo.	WDAF	610	Terre Haute, Ind.	WBOW	1230
Kingsport, Tenn.	WKPT	1400	Tulsa, Okla.	KVOO	1170
La Crosse, Wis.	WKBH	1410	Virginia, Minn.	WHLB	1400
			Wichita, Kan.	KANS	1240

12:00 M. MOUNTAIN WAR TIME

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Albuquerque, N.M.	KOB	1030	Phoenix, Ariz.	KTAR	620
Billings, Mont.	KGHL	790	Pocatello, Ida.	KSEI	930
Boise, Ida.	KIDO	1380	Safford, Ariz.	KGLU	1450
Bozeman, Mont.	KRBM	1450	Salt Lake City, Utah	KDYL	1320
Butte, Mont.	KGIR	1370	Tucson, Ariz.	KVOA	1290
Denver, Colo.	KOA	850	Twin Falls, Ida.	KTFI	1270
Helena, Mont.	KPFA	1240	Yuma, Ariz.	KYUM	1240

11:00 A.M. PACIFIC WAR TIME

City	Call Letters	Kilocycles	City	Call Letters	Kilocycles
Bakersfield, Cal.	KERN	1410	Sacramento, Cal.	KFBK	1530
Fresno, Cal.	KMJ	580	San Diego, Cal.	KFSD	600
Los Angeles, Cal.	KFI	640	Seattle, Wash.	KOMO	950
Medford, Ore.	KMED	1440	Spokane, Wash.	KHQ	590
Portland, Ore.	KGW	620			

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Memphis, Tenn.	WMC	790	San Francisco, Cal.	KPO	680
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T. W. SCHULTZ, Department of Economics, Iowa State College

WILLIAM SPENCER, Dean of the School of Business, University of Chicago (on leave); Midwest Director of War Manpower Commission

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SUGGESTED READINGS

AIKEN, GEORGE D., "The Consumer's Interest in Farm Production," *Vital Speeches*, April 15, 1942.

"A Farmer and His Troubles," *United States News*, December 18, 1942.

FAUGHT, MILLARD C., "Your Food in Wartime," *American Mercury*, April, 1942.

SUMMERS, HATTON W., "Prospective Agricultural Production," *Vital Speeches*, January 15, 1943.

WALDRON, WEBB, "Wake Up to the Farmer's Plight!" *Reader's Digest*, January, 1943.

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